Two experiments used procedures similar to those used by R. L. Greene (1989) to test the 2-process theory of the spacing effect and, in particular, the contextual-variability subtheory that applies to free-recall performance. Experiment 1 obtained a spacing effect in free recall following intentional learning but not following incidental learning, contrary to a previous result supporting the 2-process theory. Experiment 2 replicated the incidental-learning results when a slow presentation rate was used. However, with a faster presentation rate, a spacing effect was obtained, and performance exceeded that of the slow-presentation-rate condition at the longest lag. Neither the contextual-variability subtheory of 2-process theory nor an alternative deficient-processing hypothesis was able to account for all of the data.
Memory for events improves with repeated exposure. The beneficial effect, however, is greater with spaced repetitions that are separated by time and/or other events than it is with massed repetitions that occur in immediate succession. The latter phenomenon has been known at least since the time of Ebbinghaus (1885 Ebbinghaus ( /1964 , and in recent years it has come to be called the spacing effect. It has received particular attention in the more than 30 years since Melton (1967) reported that free recall of words that were repeated within a list improved monotonically as the spacing between repetitions increased.
The spacing effect has been a source of considerable interest among researchers, in part because of its uncommon generalizability. The phenomenon has been reported in studies assessing memory for a variety of different materials (e.g., Hintzman & Rogers, 1973; Kraft & Jenkins, 1981) , using many different performance measures (e.g., Challis, 1993; Underwood, Kapelak, & Malmi, 1976) , and with diverse populations ranging from young children (e.g., Toppino, 1991) to the elderly (e.g., Balota, Duchek, & Paullin, 1989) .
Not surprisingly, the spacing effect also has inspired many theoretical accounts, with most theorists attempting to explain the spacing effect in terms of either an encoding-variability or a deficient-processing mechanism. According to encodingvariability explanations (e.g., Bower, 1972; Glenberg, 1979) , spaced repetitions enhance memory performance because each occurrence is likely to be encoded differently, leading to a greater number of effective retrieval routes. In this view, massed repetitions lead to poorer performance because they are less likely to be differentially encoded. According to deficient-processing explanations (e.g., Rose & Rowe, 1976; Shaughnessy, Zimmerman, & Underwood, 1972) , repetition improves memory by increasing the total quantity and/or quality of processing that an item receives during encoding. In this view, when repetitions are sufficiently spaced, both occurrences of a repeated item are adequately processed, leading to superior memory performance. However, when repetitions are massed, one occurrence is assumed to receive inadequate processing, resulting in poorer memory.
Theories of the spacing effect can be categorized not only according to the type of mechanism proposed but also according to whether the mechanism is thought to operate voluntarily or involuntarily. If the type of mechanism and the mode of operation are construed as orthogonal dimensions allowing the categorization of existing theories (Hintzman, 1974) , all combinations have been proposed either explicitly or implicitly. For example, there are deficient-processing theories that operate voluntarily (e.g., Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980) and others that operate involuntarily (e.g., Hintzman, 1974) . Similarly, both voluntary (e.g., Glenberg, 1977) and involuntary (Glenberg, 1979) encoding-variability mechanisms have been proposed. Unfortunately, it is not clear that any of these theories can explain all of the data, which raises the possibility that a multiprocess theory will be needed to provide a completely adequate account of the spacing effect (Underwood et al., 1976) .
Recently, several theorists (Challis, 1993; Greene, 1989; Russo, Parkin, Taylor, & Wilks, 1998) have pursued a two-process account of the spacing effect. Greene (1989) offered the original version of this theory, proposing that separate mechanisms underlie the spacing effect in free-recall and in cued-memory tasks (e.g., recognition, frequency judgment, cued recall).
To account for the spacing effect in free recall, Greene (1989) proposed an automatic encoding-variability mechanism.
1 Contextual information, in this view, is assumed to be encoded automat-ically when to-be-remembered items are processed. The second presentation of a repeated item causes the study-phase retrieval of its prior presentation, and changed elements of context are automatically encoded with the item. Because contextual elements are assumed to change over time, there will be greater contextual change between spaced than massed repetitions, and more different contextual elements will be stored with the former. Consequently, in free recall, which is assumed to depend on contextual information for retrieval, there will be more retrieval routes and better memory for spaced than for massed repetitions.
To account for the spacing effect in cued-memory tasks, Greene (1989) proposed a voluntary deficient-processing subtheory. He hypothesized that learners use a rehearsal strategy in which repetitions are processed more extensively when they are judged to be less well learned. The second occurrence of a repeated item is thought to be more familiar for massed than for spaced repetitions. Consequently, a massed repetition is mistakenly thought to be better learned and receives less processing than a spaced repetition. This leads to a spacing effect when memory is assessed with a cued-memory task. Greene (1989) tested his theory by focusing on the voluntary versus involuntary characteristics of his hypothesized encoding mechanisms. He conducted one free-recall experiment in which both intentional-and incidental-learning conditions produced a spacing effect as one would expect if the spacing effect in free recall were caused by an involuntary mechanism. Thus, the findings were compatible with his contextual-variability subtheory. Greene (1989) also reported four cued-memory experiments in which he found a spacing effect in intentional-learning conditions but not in incidental-learning conditions. These findings seemed to support the hypothesis that the spacing effect in cued memory is caused by a voluntary mechanism, consistent with the deficientprocessing subtheory. Greene (1990) reported similar experiments that extended the domain of the deficient-processing subtheory to implicit as well as explicit cued-memory tasks. Challis (1993) tacitly accepted the basic framework of twoprocess theory, but proposed a different version of the deficientprocessing subtheory-one that involved automatic processes. He proposed that the spacing effect in cued-memory tasks depends on semantic processing and that the degree of semantic processing is inversely related to the degree of semantic priming. That is, the second presentation of a repeated item would receive less semantic processing to the extent that it was semantically primed by its prior presentation. The fact that semantic priming dissipates over time should cause the degree of priming to diminish as the spacing between repetitions increases, leading to more extensive semantic processing of the second presentation and better memory performance. Because semantic priming can occur automatically, the spacing effect should be obtained in incidental-learning conditions. However, Challis proposed that Greene (1989) had failed to obtain a spacing effect in incidental cued-memory tasks because he used nonsemantic orienting tasks that may have inhibited semantic priming.
To test his semantic-priming version of the deficient-processing subtheory, Challis (1993) conducted two experiments in which performance on cued-memory tasks was compared following intentional learning (which was assumed to entail semantic processing) and incidental learning with semantic and nonsemantic (graphemic) orienting tasks. A spacing effect was obtained in the intentional-learning conditions but not in the nonsemantic, incidental-learning conditions, thus replicating Greene's (1989) findings. However, when a semantic orienting task was used, incidental-learning conditions yielded a spacing effect. Additional evidence for a spacing effect in an incidental cued-memory task was reported subsequently by Greene and Stillwell (1995) . These findings are consistent with Challis's semantic-priming hypothesis but incompatible with Greene's voluntary version of the deficientprocessing subtheory. Russo et al. (1998) claimed additional support for two-process theory while further modifying the deficient-processing subtheory. In Experiment 1A, Russo et al. varied whether participants were required to divide attention between studying list words and performing a concurrent tone-detection task. A spacing effect was obtained in free recall of words in both the focused-and the divided-attention conditions, whereas in a cued-memory task (recognition of words), a spacing effect was obtained in the focusedattention condition but not in the divided-attention condition. In Experiment 1B, a spacing effect in incidental recognition was obtained in both attentional conditions when a semantic orienting task was used during list input. Russo et al. concluded that without a semantic orienting task, dividing attention inhibited semantic processing. They interpreted the findings of Experiments 1A and 1B in terms of the version of two-process theory that incorporates Challis's (1993) semantic-priming subtheory.
In their remaining two experiments, however, Russo et al. (1998) found a spacing effect in the recognition of unfamiliar faces in spite of several manipulations intended to inhibit semantic processing. To accommodate the full range of their findings, Russo et al. expanded Challis's (1993) automatic deficient-processing subtheory to include both semantic and nonsemantic (structural) priming along with a consideration of transfer-appropriate processing (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) . At relatively short spacings between repetitions, Russo et al. assumed that semantic priming could interfere with the processing of semantic information but also that nonsemantic priming could interfere with the processing of nonsemantic information. How this would influence the spacing effect would depend on the relationship between the processing requirements during encoding and the processing demands of the test situation. Because explicit cued-memory tests (e.g., recognition of words) typically involve conceptually driven processing, a spacing effect is obtained when participants engage in semantic processing during encoding but not when semantic processing is inhibited (e.g., in the divided-attention condition of Russo et al.'s, 1998, Experiment 1B) . However, when the test seems to depend on structural processing, as in the recognition of unfamiliar faces in Russo et al.'s last two experiments, then a spacing effect would be obtained when nonsemantic (structural) processing dominates during encoding (see also Cornoldi & Longoni, 1977) .
As the above review indicates, two-process theory has stimulated a substantial amount of research. Most of this work has addressed the spacing effect in cued-memory tasks, and the related deficient-processing subtheory has been revised repeatedly as findings from earlier experiments have been shown to have limited generalizability. Therefore, we were concerned about the relative paucity of research involving free recall, because the entire case for two-process theory rests on finding reliable differences in the spacing effect when free recall and cued memory are assessed under comparable conditions. The proponents of two-process theory have reported only two such free-recall experiments (Greene, 1989, Experiment 1; Russo et al., 1998, Experiment 1A) . In our own Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate one of these experiments (Greene, 1989 , Experiment 1) while eliminating a potential confound that could have influenced the earlier results. To anticipate, we did not replicate the earlier free-recall findings. In Experiment 2, we replicated the critical finding from Experiment 1 and further explored the spacing effect in free recall.
Experiment 1
In the original article proposing two-process theory, Greene (1989) reported four cued-memory experiments in which he obtained a spacing effect in intentional-but not in incidental-learning conditions. In contrast, intentional and incidental learning led to similar spacing effects in his one free-recall experiment. Although others had found spacing effects in free recall with both intentional-and incidental-learning procedures (e.g., Jensen & Freund, 1981; Shaughnessy, 1976 ), Greene's free-recall experiment provided critical support for two-process theory because it was the only one to use learning procedures comparable with those used in his cued-memory experiments. We sought to replicate Greene's free-recall findings in part to rule out the possibility that his incidental-learning results were the artifactual consequence of an extended recency effect coupled with a confounding of spacing and serial position.
Regarding the recency effect, a number of researchers (e.g., Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Glenberg, Bradley, Kraus, & Renzaglia, 1983) have studied recency effects under conditions in which participants engage in distractor activity between presentations of to-be-remembered items to inhibit rehearsal during the interpresentation interval (IPI). There is evidence that the magnitude of the recency effect depends on the ratio between the IPI and the retention interval (RI). When the ratio, IPI / RI, is higher, the recency effect is greater. Also, when incidental-learning procedures are used, an exaggerated recency effect is sometimes found that extends over virtually the entire list (Glenberg et al., 1983; Glenberg et al., 1980) . These findings, however, seem to be limited to free recall and do not occur in cued-memory tasks (e.g., Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Glenberg & Krauss, 1981) .
In Greene's (1989) experiments, it seemed that the orienting task (requiring participants to figure out a sequential rule) might have functioned as an interitem distractor task. The fact that Greene used a slow (10 s) presentation rate would have created a relatively high IPI-RI ratio. When incidental-learning procedures and free recall were added to the mix, a pronounced, extended recency effect may have been created. A similar effect, however, would not have been expected in Greene's cued-memory experiments.
A recency effect would be a problem only if serial position were not adequately controlled across spacing conditions. Greene (1989) attempted to control serial position by randomly assigning an equal number of items representing each spacing condition to each quarter of the study list. However, this may not have been sufficient. Within each quarter of the list, and thus for the list as a whole, the final presentations of repeated items would have tended to occur nearer to the end, on the average, when repetitions were separated by greater spacings. That is, spacing may have been confounded with serial position such that memory for items with longer spacings would have benefited more from an extended recency effect.
In the present experiment, we assessed the spacing effect in free recall as a function of the intentionality of learning. Our procedures were similar to those used by Greene (1989) except that we used a more stringent method of controlling serial position.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 48 introductory psychology students at Villanova University. Twenty-four were assigned randomly in blocks to the two groups created by a 2 (intentionality of learning) ϫ 4 (repetition-spacing) mixed factorial design with the second factor (oncepresented items and twice-presented items repeated after spacings of zero, four, or eight intervening items) varied within-subjects.
Materials. Two list structures containing 59 serial positions were generated. Slots 11-49 were reserved for 4 once-presented filler items and for the 20 critical items representing the repetition-spacing conditions of the experiment. These latter included 5 once-presented experimental items and 15 twice-presented items (5 each involving interrepetition lags of zero, four, and eight intervening items). To minimize serial-positions effects, both structures began and ended with slots for 10 once-presented primacy and recency buffers, respectively. To further control for serial-position effects, the mean serial position of the final occurrence of repeated experimental items was equated for each of the three spacing conditions, and these in turn were equated with the mean serial position of once-presented experimental items.
Stimuli consisted of 22 high-frequency nouns and 22 high-frequency adjectives that were four to seven letters in length and were selected to avoid obvious semantic associations among items. All words were highimagery items with the nouns being greater than 5.3 on the 7-point scale used by Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) and the adjectives being greater than 3.6 on the 5-point scale used by Berrian, Metzler, Kroll, and Clark-Meyers (1979) .
Eight lists containing an equal number of nouns and adjectives were created, and an equal number of participants in each between-subjects condition received each list. Four lists were made from each list structure. To construct the first study list from each list structure, five words were assigned randomly to the four repetition-spacing conditions with the restriction that two of the conditions be represented by two nouns and three adjectives, whereas the remaining two conditions were represented by three nouns and two adjectives. To construct the remaining three lists with each list structure, the critical items were rotated through the four repetitionspacing conditions. Thus, across lists, each experimental condition was represented equally often by the same set of items consisting of half nouns and half adjectives. To complete the study lists, an equal number of nouns and adjectives were assigned randomly to serve as primacy buffers, recency buffers, and once-presented filler items. To avoid creating runs of one grammatical class, no more than five items in succession were allowed to be from the same grammatical class.
Procedure. There were 1-4 individuals participating in each experimental session. Each was seated at his or her own cubicle. Following the procedure of Greene's (1989) study, we told participants that they would view a series of nouns and adjectives and that a complex rule determined whether a noun or an adjective would occur at each point in the sequence. Their task was to view the entire list and to discover the rule. (Of course, there was no rule.) Participants in the intentional-learning condition were also instructed to memorize the words for a subsequent memory test. However, participants in the incidental-learning condition were not warned about the test.
Words were presented in uppercase letters at a 10-s rate. Each word was preceded by a tone delivered through headphones. It appeared on the computer screen for 2.2 s and was followed by a blank interval of 7.8 s.
Following presentation of the list, we asked participants to state the rule if they could. Then they were given an answer sheet with 44 blank spaces and were allowed 5 min to recall as many words as they could from the preceding list.
Results and Discussion
Because frequency of occurrence and the spacing between repetitions are conceptually distinct variables, their effects were assessed in separate analyses. Significance was set at p ϭ .05 for all tests.
The effects of intentionality and frequency (once-versus twicepresented items, collapsed across spacing conditions) were examined in a 2 ϫ 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor. The percentage of correct recall was higher following intentional learning (M ϭ 36.40%) than following incidental learning (M ϭ 22.08%), F(1, 46) ϭ 10.93, MSE ϭ 449.71. In addition, twice-presented items were recalled better than once-presented items, following both intentional learning (M ϭ 47.79 vs. 25.00) and incidental learning (M ϭ 28.33 vs. 15.83). The main effect of frequency was significant, F(1, 46) ϭ 32.69, MSE ϭ 228.57, but the Intentionality ϫ Frequency interaction was not, F(1, 46) ϭ 2.78, MSE ϭ 228.57.
The spacing effect data are presented in Figure 1 and were examined in a 2 (intentionality) ϫ 3 (spacing) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of intentionality, indicating that intentional learning led to better free recall than did incidental learning, F(1, 46) ϭ 18.13, MSE ϭ 772.34. The main effect of spacing was not reliable, F(2, 92) ϭ 1.82, MSE ϭ 303.14, but there was a significant Intentionality ϫ Spacing interaction, F(2, 92) ϭ 4.96, MSE ϭ 303.14. Analyses of simple main effects indicated that the spacing effect was significant in the intentionallearning condition, F(2, 92) ϭ 6.29, MSE ϭ 303.14, but not in the incidental-learning condition, F(2, 92) Ͻ 1.00, MSE ϭ 303.14.
The evidence that Greene (1989) reported in support of his two-process theory crucially depended on the effect that spacing had on performance in his incidental-learning conditions. That is, although intentional learning yielded a spacing effect regardless of the retrieval task, incidental learning produced a spacing effect in free recall and not in cued-memory tasks. We replicated the essential features of Greene's free-recall experiment, taking added measures to reduce the chances that the spacing effect could be contaminated by an extended recency effect. Under these circumstances, we found a spacing effect in the intentional-learning condition. Although the shape of the function was a bit unusual, the findings were consistent with those of Greene (1989) and many others in showing that longer spacings lead to better free recall than do shorter spacings following intentional learning.
2 Unlike Greene (1989) , however, we found no hint of a spacing effect in free recall following incidental learning. The overall pattern of our free-recall data resembles the findings Greene reported in his cued-memory experiments using similar learning conditions. These findings are not consistent with predictions of the automatic contextual-variability subcomponent of two-process theory, nor are they supportive of the more general assumption of two-process theory that functionally different processes underlie the spacing effect in free-recall and cued-memory tasks.
Experiment 2
The pattern of data obtained in Experiment 1 appears consistent with the hypothesis that the spacing effect in free recall is produced by voluntary mechanisms that are not engaged in incidentallearning conditions. However, there is considerable evidence in the literature indicating that automatic mechanisms are sufficient to produce the spacing effect in both free-recall (e.g., Shaughnessy, 1976; Toppino, 1991) and cued-memory tasks (e.g., Challis, 1993; Greene and Stillwell, 1995) . Therefore, in Experiment 1 it seemed more likely that involuntary processes that are normally sufficient to produce a spacing effect were somehow neutralized in the incidental-learning condition.
One possible explanation can be derived from Greene's (1989) automatic contextual-variability subtheory. According to this view, recall of twice-presented items is proportional to the degree of contextual change that takes place between occurrences of the repeated item. When the degree of contextual change reaches asymptote, performance should likewise reach asymptote and remain at a high but constant level with further increases in spacing. The unusually slow presentation rate used in Experiment 1 produced long intervals between the presentations of successive items, including the successive occurrences of massed-repetition items. If this long interval (perhaps in conjunction with other features of the methodology) were sufficient to produce maximal contextual change, the spacing effect would have been eliminated. Perfor- This theoretical analysis predicts that a spacing effect should emerge under the incidental-learning procedures of Experiment 1 if a substantially faster presentation rate were to be used. Furthermore, although performance should improve with increased spacing in a fast-presentation-rate condition, it should not exceed the level of performance produced by the previous slow-presentationrate condition.
A similar explanation of the results of Experiment 1, along with similar predictions, can be derived from the latest version of the automatic deficient-processing subtheory (Russo et al., 1998) . Although this subtheory was proposed, tested, and revised in the context of research on cued-memory tasks, we see no principled reason why it should not be applicable to free-recall tasks.
According to this view, priming from the first occurrence of a repeated item can interfere with the processing of similar information on its second occurrence. As the spacing between repetitions increases, priming dissipates, interference is reduced, and the second occurrence receives more effective processing. This will produce a spacing effect if the primed information during input is appropriate for transfer to the retrieval task. Because a free-recall task such as that used in Experiment 1 is usually considered to be a conceptually driven explicit-memory task, the spacing effect would most likely be determined by the degree of semantic priming during input.
The extent of priming and its longevity may vary with the level of processing (e.g., Hamann, 1990) . Therefore, relatively weak semantic priming may have been produced in Experiment 1 because the orienting task required participants to process each word's part of speech (i.e., noun or adjective). Whatever semantic priming may have been induced automatically in the incidentallearning condition of Experiment 1 may not have survived the long interitem intervals associated with the unusually slow presentation rate. If priming were negligible even in the massed-repetition condition, an asymptotic level of performance would have been obtained at all spacings, thereby eliminating the spacing effect.
According to both of the accounts described above, the lack of a spacing effect in the incidental-learning condition of Experiment 1 was attributable to the use of an unusually slow presentation rate that led to an asymptotic level of performance for twicepresented items regardless of the spacing between repetitions. In Experiment 2, we tested both of the above hypotheses by varying presentation rate while employing the incidental-learning procedures of Experiment 1. One condition replicated the slow (10 s per item) presentation rate used previously. The other involved a much faster rate of 3 s per item.
We expected to replicate the incidental-learning results of Experiment 1 by finding no spacing effect in the slow-presentationrate condition. According to both hypotheses discussed above, a spacing effect should have emerged in the fast-presentation-rate condition. Performance should have risen with increasing spacing toward, but not beyond, the presumably asymptotic level of recall reflected in the performance of the slow-presentation-rate condition.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 72 introductory psychology students. Thirty-six participants were assigned randomly in blocks of two to each of the two between-subjects conditions created by a 2 (presentation rate) ϫ 4 (frequency-spacing) mixed factorial design. Stimuli were presented to participants at a 3-s rate in one group and at a 10-s rate in the other group. Within each list, items were presented either once or twice with interpresentation lags of zero, four, or eight intervening items.
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that all participants received incidentallearning instructions.
Results and Discussion
The first analysis examined the effect of frequency in a 2 (presentation rate) ϫ 2 (frequency) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. The only significant effect was the main effect of frequency, F(1, 70) ϭ 32.44, MSE ϭ 148.89, indicating that twice-presented items (M ϭ 25.75%) were recalled better than once-presented items (M ϭ 14.17%).
The spacing effect data are presented in Figure 2 and were examined in a 2 (presentation rate) ϫ 3 (spacing) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. There was no significant main effect of either presentation rate, F(1, 70) ϭ 2.30, MSE ϭ 389.63, or spacing, F(2, 140) Ͻ 1.00, MSE ϭ 311.53. However, the Presentation Rate ϫ Spacing interaction was significant, F(2, 140) ϭ 3.50, MSE ϭ 311.53. Analyses of simple main effects indicated that there was no reliable effect of spacing in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition, F(2, 140) Ͻ 1.00, MSE ϭ 311.53, thereby replicating the incidental-learning results of Experiment 1. However, in accordance with the predictions of both the contextual-variability subtheory of two-process theory and the automatic-priming version of the deficient-processing subtheory, there was a clear spacing effect in the 3-s-presentation-rate condition, F(2, 140) ϭ 4.01, MSE ϭ 311.53.
It is interesting to note that neither of the above hypotheses was supported by another aspect of the findings. Recall in the 3-spresentation-rate condition not only rose to the level attained in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition but actually exceeded it at the longest spacing. This was borne out by a comparison of perfor- mance in the 3-s-presentation-rate condition with the overall mean performance in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition (all lags combined). We chose the latter figure for comparison because it should provide the best estimate of the actual level of performance attained in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition. Contrary to the predictions of both Greene's (1989) contextual variability subtheory and the priming version of the deficient-processing subtheory (Challis, 1993; Russo et al., 1998) , we found that Lag-8 items in the 3-s-presentation-rate condition were recalled significantly better than items in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition, t(70) ϭ 2.49.
The latter finding cannot be attributed to a general recall advantage for participants in the 3-s-presentation-rate condition. The two presentation-rate groups did not differ significantly in their overall level of performance and exhibited virtually identical recall of once-presented items. This lack of overall differences is consistent with theoretical expectations because presentation rate in incidental-learning conditions is not associated with differences in mnemonic activity as it is in intentional-learning conditions. Results in the two presentation-rate conditions differed only in the pattern of performance obtained with twice-presented items, and this seems attributable solely to differences in the time intervals separating repetitions. The role of temporal spacing is considered further in the General Discussion.
General Discussion Greene (1989) reported equivalent spacing effects in incidental and intentional free recall. However, we suspected that his results may have been contaminated by a confounding of serial position with an extended recency effect. When we rigorously controlled serial position while otherwise replicating Greene's procedures in Experiment 1, we obtained a spacing effect in intentional but not in incidental free recall. The latter result was replicated in Experiment 2. Combining across experiments, the power of our incidental-learning conditions for detecting a spacing effect comparable with that obtained in our intentional-learning condition was greater than .99. These findings call into serious question the free-recall results reported by Greene (1989) and underscore the importance of carefully controlling serial position in research on the spacing effect, especially when retention is measured by freerecall performance.
Our findings also call into question the dissociation between free-recall and cued-memory tasks that constituted Greene's (1989) primary evidence in favor of two-process theory. In several cued-memory experiments, he obtained a spacing effect following intentional learning but not following incidental learning. In his single free-recall experiment, he reported a spacing effect in free recall that was uninfluenced by the intentionality of learning. In contrast, our data show that when serial position is adequately controlled, Greene's procedures yield the same pattern of results in free recall as he repeatedly obtained in his cued-memory experiments. The dissociation reported by Greene (1989) appears to have been artifactual.
Our results weaken the body of evidence supporting a twoprocess theory of the form originally proposed by Greene (1989) and modified by Russo et al. (1998) . However, our findings should not be interpreted as suggesting that there are no differences in the mechanisms underlying the spacing effect in free-recall and cuedmemory tasks. To the extent that different retrieval tasks rely on different processes or different information, it is reasonable to suppose that spacing effects in different retrieval tasks may have somewhat different causes, and there is some evidence to support this possibility (e.g., Glenberg & Smith, 1981; Russo et al., 1998) . How the mechanisms underlying the spacing effect may vary across retrieval tasks seems likely to be a complicated issue that deserves the careful scrutiny of further research. Nevertheless, our results serve as a reminder that different retrieval tasks often yield similar spacing effects that may reflect shared underlying processes With respect to free recall, Greene (1989) proposed that the spacing effect in free recall is produced by an automatic contextual-variability mechanism, and this hypothesis has been implicitly or explicitly accepted by others (e.g., Russo et al., 1998) . The fact that we obtained a spacing effect following incidental learning when a relatively fast presentation rate was used in Experiment 2 is consistent with the assumption that the spacing effect in free recall is produced by automatic or involuntary processes. However, neither Greene's automatic contextualvariability mechanism, nor an extension of the priming version of deficient-processing theory (e.g., Challis, 1993; Russo et al., 1998) from its original cued-memory domain to free recall were able to account for the other major characteristics of our findings. In fact, it is not clear that any automatic encoding-variability or deficientprocessing mechanism can account for our data. To explain why there was no spacing effect when incidental learning involved a slow presentation rate, both kinds of mechanism seem to require the assumption that performance was at an asymptotic level regardless of the spacing between repetitions. But then neither mechanism seems able to account for the fact that performance in the fast-presentation-rate condition exceeded the presumed asymptote at long lags.
Although encoding-variability and/or deficient-processing mechanisms may contribute to the spacing effect in some circumstances, the difficulty they both have in accounting for our results suggests the possible involvement of some other kind of mechanism. A clue to the nature of this mechanism might be revealed by viewing our data as a function of the temporal spacing between repetitions. Given the conceptual basis of our experiments, we followed the customary procedure of defining spacing in terms of the lag or the number of items separating repetitions. However, the time separating repetitions varied greatly with differences in the presentation rate. Lags of zero, four, and eight intervening items corresponded, respectively, to temporal spacings of 0.8, 12.8, and 24.8 s in the 3-s-presentation-rate condition and to temporal spacings of 7.8, 47.8, and 87.8 s in the 10-s-presentation-rate condition.
If one makes the simplifying assumption that presentation rate influenced performance primarily through its effect on temporal spacing, one can disregard presentation rate and the data may be displayed as a function of six levels of temporal spacing ranging from 0.8 to 87.8 s (see Figure 3) . When viewed in this way, performance exhibited an inverted-U-shaped function. It is unclear how encoding-variability and deficient-processing mechanisms might be modified to account for this function. However, it seems potentially consistent with study-phase retrieval explanations of the spacing effect that occasionally are proposed in the literature (e.g., Braun & Rubin, 1998; Thios & D'Agostino, 1976 ).
In the latter view, an item's first presentation must be retrieved at the time of its second occurrence for memory to improve with increases in spacing. Although study-phase-retrieval processes may be assumed to be initiated automatically (e.g., Greene, 1989) , the probability of successful study-phase retrieval decreases with increased spacing. Thus, there must be some level of spacing at which the balance between these processes shifts and performance begins to decline with further increases in spacing. The point of maximum performance would be expected to occur at higher or lower levels of spacing depending on whether conditions were more or less favorable for successful study-phase retrieval. In our Experiment 2, which involved a nonsemantic orienting task, maximum performance might be expected to occur at a relatively modest level of spacing. However, if conditions were to involve more semantic or elaborative processing (e.g., intentional learning in Experiment 1), the maximum might occur at a higher level of spacing. In fact, in many experiments the maximum might be expected to occur beyond the range of the spacings being investigated so that performance would increase monotonically over the observed sample of spacings.
The above account of our data is clearly speculative and post hoc, and it should be regarded with considerable caution. However, encoding-variability and deficient-processing mechanisms cannot account for our findings and have yet to provide a generally adequate account of the broader spacing-effect literature (Dempster, 1996) . In view of these facts, a study-phase retrieval mechanism seems worthy of further consideration as a factor contributing to the explanation both of our findings and of the spacing effect in general.
